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STATE COMMON-LAW CHOICE-OF-LAW
DOCTRINE AND SAME-SEX "MARRIAGE":
HOW WILL STATES ENFORCE THE
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION?
PROFESSOR L. LYNN HOGUEt
[Hiomosexual marriage is an oxymoron.1
INTRODUCTION
Public policy is an important determinant of choice of law,2 cus-
tomarily applied as an exception to a general rule that foreign law
applies to a dispute because of a forum choice-of-law rule that directs
a foreign rule's application. 3 The practice of excusing compliance with
otherwise-applicable foreign law has particular pertinence in the case
of marriage laws which are themselves rich in public policy concerns
for the institution itself,4 for the rearing of children, if any, born of the
union, 5 and for the regulation of family property, including its applica-
tion to the support of family members6 and its transmission at death.
7
t Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law, A.B., William Jew-
ell College, 1966; M.A., University of Tennessee, 1968; Ph.D., 1972; J.D., Duke Univer-
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1. Richard F. Duncan, Homosexual Marriage and the Myth of Tolerance: Is Cardi-
nal O'Connor A "Homophobe"?, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 587, 589
(1996).
2. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 1918); Paulsen &
Sovern, "Public Policy" in Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956).
3. See generally Alexander v. General Motors, 478 S.E.2d 123 (Ga. 1996) (apply-
ing Virginia law on products liability selected by the generally applicable choice-of-law
rule of lex loci delicti and holding that it violated Georgia's public policy of allowing
recovery against manufacturers of defective products); Intercontinental Hotel Corp. v.
Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 1964) (holding that a New York public policy against gam-
bling did not preclude enforcement of a gambling debt incurred in Puerto Rico).
4. Robert F. Drinan, What are the Rights of the Involuntary Divorcee? Reflections
on Divisible Divorce, 53 Ky. L.J. 209 (1965).
5. See, e.g., Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the
Meaning of Marriage, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547 (1998) (analyzing the roles of law,
family, marriage, and community).
6. See, e.g., Stephanie Bienvenu Laborde, Louisiana Divorce Reform: For Better or
For Worse?, 50 LA. L. REV. 995, 997 (1990) (noting that there are "important public
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Recently, in Baker v. General Motors Corp.,8 the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality as well as the continu-
ing vitality of the public policy doctrine in choice of law. Although
states are bound by the Full Faith and Credit Clause 9 to enforce judg-
ments, they are free through their forum choice-of-law rules to decide
whether or not to apply foreign law to a dispute properly before the
court. 10
This article will first consider the common-law principles of mar-
riage recognition and the important role played by the public policy
exception which allows states to refuse recognition to foreign mar-
riages which violate the public policy forum. Next, attention is paid to
the difficulties in administering the public policy exception and the
particular problems experienced with foreign marriage recognition.
The constitutional underpinnings of the public policy exception is the
next topic. The analysis concludes with a consideration of two para-
digm cases widely read by conflicts students - In re May's Estate1
and In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate1 2 - which illustrate that the public
policy exception will not be invoked to avoid enforcing foreign mar-
riages unless they directly implicate conduct by the parties which vio-
lates the deeply held moral values of the forum. Homosexual unions
will likely be held violative of a state's public policy if an end of the
litigation is to establish the licitness of venereal acts between homo-
sexuals in a "same-sex union," as distinguished from incidental issues
between the parties, so long as the state does not deprive its courts of
jurisdiction over such matters altogether.
policies supporting the requirement of proof of fault for a party to obtain a divorce in
less than one year").
7. See, e.g., Mary F. Radford & F. Skip Sugarman, Georgia's New Probate Code,
13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 605, 661 (1997) (analyzing public policy as it relates to probate
matters).
8. 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998).
9. The Full Faith and Credit Clause states:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by gen-
eral Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.
10. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 663-64 (1998) ("The Full
Faith and Credit Clause does not compel 'a state to substitute the statutes of other
states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is compe-
tent to legislate' [citing inter alia Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939)1). Regarding judgments, however, the full faith and credit
obligation is more exacting. A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with
adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment,
qualifies for recognition throughout the land.").
11. 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).
12. 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
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COMMON-LAW PRINCIPLES OF MARRIAGE RECOGNITION
Recognition of foreign marriages is largely governed by the princi-
ple that if valid where performed or celebrated, they are valid every-
where unless violative of the public policy of the forum. 13 This rule
has a long history collected in both the First 14 and Second Restate-
ments 15 of Conflict of Laws and drawn, of course, from the general
13. See, e.g., Hesington v. Estate of Hesington, 640 S.W.2d 824, 826 (1982) (declar-
ing that Missouri would not recognize a common-law marriage purported to be con-
tracted in Oklahoma, where such marriages were valid, in a case of two Missouri
residents who temporarily left Missouri, consummated their marriage in Oklahoma,
and returned immediately to Missouri, where common-law marriages violated the fo-
rum's expressed public policy). Some states provide for this result by statute. See CAL.
CIV. CODE ANN., § 63 (West 1998); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-209 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-115 (1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.040 (Michie 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-117
(Revised 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-4 (Michie 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-1-38
(Michie 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4 (1995).
14. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 134 (1934).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1969). According to the
Restatement:
A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage
was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the
strong public policy of another state which had the most significant relation-
ship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.
Id. Comments j and k clarify the operant policy considerations:
[A] marriage which meets the requirements of the state where the marriage
was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid except when to do so
would violate the strong policy of another state which had the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage. To
date, a marriage has been held invalid in such circumstances only when it vio-
lated a strong policy of a state where at least one of the spouses was domiciled
at the time of the marriage and where both made their home immediately
thereafter.
Id. § 283 cmt. j, k. Determination of the potency of a forum policy sufficient to vitiate a
foreign marriage is based primarily on "explicit statute or judicial precedent." Absent
such authority, the commentators speculate that "the only rules that the forum would
be likely to find embody a sufficiently strong policy of [the forum] to warrant invalida-
tion of an out-of-state marriage are rules which prohibit polygamous marriages, certain
incestuous marriages [e.g., "where the persons involved were in so close a relationship
as brother and sister and perhaps uncle and niece"], or the marriage of minors below a
certain age." Id. § 283 cmt. k. As a practical matter, express statutes in several states
would add homosexual marriages to this list (see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie
1997); IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701 (West 1997)),
although it is likely that in states lacking such statutory prohibitions, judges would find
enough in the common law to justify a public policy against recognizing homosexual
unions as a "marriage." E.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) ("[T]o claim
that a right to engage in [consensual sodomy] is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious.").
19981
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practice of states.16 The public policy exception, like conflicts rules
generally, is a product of the common law.17
The public policy exception has not been without its critics.
Professors Paulsen and Sovern offer this apt and blunt critique of the
limitations of the public policy exception:
The most troublesome use of public policy comes when it is
employed as a cloak for the selection of local law to govern a
transaction having important local contacts. Resort to the
concept is beguilingly easy and does not demand the hard
thinking which the careful formulation of narrower, more re-
alistic, choice of law rules would require. Most of the critics
have argued for a narrowing of the area in which opinions
resort to public policy. They contend that foreign transac-
tions will otherwise be judged according to "local fancies" and
subjected to judicial parochialism .... We urge that courts
make the proper distinctions. We urge that courts take a sec-
ond look and ask, "In what sense are we applying the public
policy doctrine?" If judges honestly put the question whether
the foreign law is barbarous in its provisions or frightfully
unjust in the particular case, few cases will provide an affirm-
ative answer. If a judge sees that, in a given case, public pol-
icy doctrine substitutes for choice of law, he should address
himself directly to questions concerning choice of law policy.
The principal vice of the public policy concepts is that they
provide a substitute for analysis. The concepts stand in the
way of careful thought, of discriminating distinctions, and of
true policy development in the conflict of laws.18
Sadly, such criticism, valid when it was published in the mid-
1950s, remains true today. State courts have persisted in offering lit-
tle in the way of a satisfactory doctrinal foundation for the public-pol-
icy exception. 19 Scholars have shown limited interest in the
16. See, e.g., In re Takahashi's Estate, 129 P.2d 217, 220 (Mont. 1942) (stating that
a miscegenation marriage between Japanese and Caucasian residents prohibited by the
Montana forum statute should not be recognized even when solemnized in Washington
where such marriages were legal); In re Vetas' Estate, 170 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1946)
(voiding a common-law marriage contracted out-of-state by Utah residents).
17. An exception is Louisiana, which has codified its conflicts law. See IA. Crv.
CODE ANN. art. 3515 (West 1998).
18. Paulsen & Sovern, 56 COLUM. L. REV. at 1016.
19. E.g., Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986). In Paul, after re-
jecting various modern approaches to choice of law in favor of the traditional resort to
place of injury in tort cases, the court concluded:
[W]e remain convinced that the traditional rule, for all of its faults, remains
superior to any of its modern competitors. Moreover, if we are going to manipu-
late conflicts doctrine in order to achieve substantive results, we might as well
[Vol. 32
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exception, and, as noted above,20 it is generally taught in law schools
as an example of an escape device to evade application of an unsavory
result compelled by a robust application of a straightforward rule.
2 1
Notwithstanding this lack of scholarly attention, state court judges as-
sure that the exception continues to be an important part of the law of
conflicts. Indeed, it may never assume the sort of principled contours
that would make it acceptable to modern critics. Yet the exception is
an important aspect of federalism, as noted below,2 2 because states
find it an essential tool to protect their courts from odious foreign
rules.
PROBLEMS WITH ADMINISTERING THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION
Alexander v. General Motors Corp., Inc. ,23 a products liability case
decided by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1996, nicely illustrates the
problems in applying the public policy exception, particularly the diffi-
culties that arise from a paucity of precedent. In Alexander, the court
held that Georgia's rule of lex loci delicti did not apply to an injury
occurring in Virginia, because Virginia products liability law, which
did not provide for strict liability, was contrary to public policy of
Georgia. Instead, the court held that Georgia's statute imposing strict
liability on manufacturers 24 would apply.2 5 In crafting a successful
brief and oral argument in that case, I found that the only recent case
applying the exception 26 was a worker's compensation decision from
manipulate something we understand... [and thus] reaffirm our adherence to
the doctrine of lex loci delicti.
[However, tioday we declare that automobile guest passenger statutes violate
the strong public policy of this state in favor of compensating persons injured
by the negligence of others.
Paul, 352 S.E.2d at 556. For a discussion of the role of federal courts in shaping con-
flicts law in diversity cases and the resultant problems, see L. Lynn Hogue, Law in a
Parallel Universe: Erie's Betrayal, Diversity Jurisdiction, Georgia Conflict of Laws
Questions in Contracts Cases in the Eleventh Circuit, and Certification Reform, 11 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 531 (1995).
20. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
21. E.g., CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAws 69-79 (5th ed. 1993).
22. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
23. 478 S.E.2d 123 (Ga. 1996).
24. Alexander v. General Motors Corp., Inc., 478 S.E.2d 123, 124 (Ga. 1996).
25. Alexander, 478 S.E.2d at 124.
26. See, e.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. Robertson, 66 S.E. 535 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909) ("It is
well recognized that where the tort is committed in one state, and suit is brought on
account of it in the courts of another state, the plaintiffs right of action and the substan-
tive law applied to the transaction will be controlled exclusively by the lex loci delicti, so
far as the same is not repugnant to the public policy of the state where the suit is
brought, or is not forbidden recognition by the courts of that state by reason of some
1998]
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the Georgia Court of Appeals, Karimi v. Crowley,27 which was only
tenuously tangent with the facts of Alexander. In resolving the case,
the court in Alexander effectively shirked its common-law responsibil-
ity and added nothing in the way of doctrinal clarification to the area.
Georgia law remains as impoverished as I found it when I took up
my client's cause: public policy exists, but the considerations which
govern its application remain vague. 28 It is difficult to overstate the
tragedy of such missed opportunities, because instances of the public
policy doctrine's application arise so seldom that opportunities for
clarification in the law should not be lost. I mention this to suggest
the pervasive and persisting problems with respect to the public policy
exception in state law. Nonetheless, the public policy exception re-
mains a valuable and enduring part of the law of conflicts and one
which has particular relevance to the matter of inter-jurisdictional
marriage recognition.
PROBLEMS WITH FOREIGN MARRIAGES
Common-law applications of the public policy exception have not
invariably led to the nonrecognition of apparently repugnant or odious
foreign marriages (marriages substantially dissimilar to those prac-
ticed in the forum state such as plural or incestuous marriages).29 In
fact, the usual result in cases where recognition of a foreign marriage
is sought is recognition of the marriage, not invalidation. This com-
passionate - or more precise, nuanced - application of the public
policy exception has given proponents of legitimizing so-called same-
sex marriages 30 apparent cause for hope that such homosexual unions
other principle of private international law."). Other, older cases are similarly
unilluminating.
27. Karimi v. Crowley, 324 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (declaring that Georgia's
public policy of affording an exclusive remedy in workers' compensation cases trumped
lex loci delicti with respect to the claim of a worker injured in Alabama under whose law
recovery against the general contractor would be allowed). See also L. LYNN HOGUE,
CONFLICT OF LAws IN GEORGIA § 4-1, § 9-2 (1995) (discussing Karimi).
28. See, e.g., Tuggle v. Helms, 499 S.E.2d 365, 369-70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (McMur-
ray, J., dissenting) (illustrating the vague application of public policy).
29. See, e.g., In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (ana-
lyzing a plural marriage and declaring that "under the laws of California and the public
policy thereof, only the first wife of decedent can be recognized as his legal widow"); In
re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953) (analyzing a marriage between an uncle and
his niece). See also Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public
Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998) (discussing public policy as it relates to polygamous
and incestuous marriages).
30. I am not persuaded by the argument that same-sex relationships are in any
sense a "marriage" irrespective of the efforts of Hawaiian judges to make them so. See
Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No 31-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)
(holding a state statute prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying unconstitutional),
affd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997) (unpublished table decision).
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will or should enjoy similar treatment at the common law. This analy-
sis will show that anticipation to be illusory. What remains clear is
that the longstanding practice of states in refusing recognition to un-
ions it finds unacceptable is both salutary and constitutional. 3 1 It pro-
tects the interests of the forum in maintaining the integrity of a
fundamental element of civil society - the traditional marriage be-
tween a man and a woman 32 - and upholds a major tenant of federal-
ism by preserving the field of domestic relations both appropriately
and historically for states.33
Same-sex "marriage" recognition, however, presents problems
which are different in kind from those presented in other choice-of-law
applications of the public policy exception. Outside of the context of
domestic relations, for example, the degree of dissimilarity and a con-
sequent odium attached to foreign law is simply not present. Com-
mon-law applications of the public policy exception generally involve
31. Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional
Public Policy Exeption, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997) (arguing that the public policy excep-
tion is unconstitutional because it discriminates against out-of-state marriages). Where
such discrimination is well grounded, as in a refusal to enforce morally repugnant law
(as opposed to judgments), it is constitutional. Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 657; Richard S.
Myers, Same-Sex "Marriage" and the Public Policy Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 45
(1998).
32. The Catholic Catechism is illustraive:
Sexuality is ordered to the conjugal love of man and woman. In marriage the
physical intimacy of the spouses becomes a sign and pledge of spiritual commu-
nion. Marriage bonds between baptized persons are sanctified by the
sacrament.
Sexuality, by means of which man and woman give themselves to one another
through the acts which are proper and exclusive to spouses, is not something
simply biological, but concerns the innermost being of the human persons as
such. It is realized in a truly human way only if it is an integral part of the love
by which a man and woman commit themselves totally to one another until
death.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2360-61 (1994). Similarly:
The matrimonial covenant, by which a man and a woman establish between
themselves a partnership of the whole of life, is by its nature ordered toward
the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of offspring; this
covenant between baptized persons has been raised by Christ the Lord to the
dignity of a sacrament.
CODE OF CANON LAw Can. 1055, § 1 (Lat.-Eng. ed. 1983). Although it is clear from con-
text that under canon law only a marriage between a man and a woman is licit, in view
of the effort, for example in Hawaii, to legalize "same-sex" unions some qualification of
the language of Canon 1058 ("All persons who are not prohibited by law can contract
marriage.") may be warranted. See also ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.011 (Michie 1997); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 741.212 (1997); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.3-3.1 (Supp. 1998); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 86 (West 1998); 23 PA. CoNs. STAT.
§ 1102 (1997).
33. See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858). See generally Michael
Ashley Stein, The Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction: Rethinking an
Unsettled Federal Court Doctrine, 36 B.C. L. REV. 669 (1995) (describing "the history of
the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction from its origin in Barber v.
Barber").
1998]
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merely enough dissimilarity in the respective laws to produce different
outcomes with no moral opprobrium attached.
Proponancy of recognition of same-sex unions has raised the
stakes and precipitated conflicts doctrine into the culture wars 34 and,
as Lynn Wardle has demonstrated, radically tilted the deliberative
playing field of scholarship. 35 My hope is to clarify why the nuanced
and compassionate common-law applications of the public policy ex-
ception which worked well in other types of marriage recognition cases
have no application to same-sex unions. Although some may dismiss
such a line of analysis under the epithet of so-called "homophobia," I
persist in believing that a well-grounded distaste for particular con-
duct that is viewed as morally objectionable by a majority within a
democratic society - and hence proscribable under the police power 36
in the same way that other socially undesired conduct such as drug
use or prostitution is banable 3 7 - is not a product of unreasoned fear,
as the term suggests, but rather of proper moral reservation. As
Judge Robert Bork has wisely observed: "Moral objection to homosex-
ual practices is not the same thing as animus, unless all disapprovals
based on morality are to be disallowed as mere animus. Modern liber-
alism tends to classify all moral distinctions it does not accept as hate-
ful and invalid."3 s
A number of states have adopted statutes regulating the recogni-
tion of same-sex unions.3 9 Those statutes will control in states which
have them. In instances in which a state lacks a statute, the common
34. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Extraterritorial Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriage: When Theory Confronts Praxis, 16 QUINNipiAc L. REV. 1 (1996); Larry
Kramer, The Public Policy Exception and the Problem of Extra-Territorial Recognition of
Same-Sex Marriages, 16 QuINIPiAc L. REV. 153 (1996); Rebecca S. Paige, Comment,
Wagging the Dog - If the State of Hawaii Accepts Same-Sex Marriage Will Other States
Have To?: An Examination of Conflict of Laws and Escape Devises, 47 Am. U. L. REV.
165 (1997) (analyzing Baehr v. Miike, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and conflict of
laws rules).
35. Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex
Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 18 (1996).
36. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (stating that "States'
traditional police power is defined as the authority to provide for the public health,
safety, and morals, and such a basis for legislation has been upheld") (citing Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)).
37. See Brache v. County of Westchester, 507 F. Supp. 566, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(declaring that it is within the county government's police power to curtail illicit drug
use) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (criminalizing the addiction to
narcotics)).
38. ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE 113 (1996).
39. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109
(Michie 1997); IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (Michie 1998);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701 (West 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (1997).
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law (through the public-policy exception) will continue to supply the
appropriate rule.
CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION
The public policy exception, which protects states against the ap-
plication of foreign laws that are repugnant to the principles upon
which the forum state is grounded, is rooted in principles of federal-
ism 40 and the protection of sovereignty which inheres in the Tenth
Amendment. 4 1 The rationale for federalism's willingness to allocate
the power to decide issues of domestic relations to more than one state
is well described in Williams v. North Carolina,4 2 in which the Court
concluded:
No State can assume comprehensive attention to the various
and potentially conflicting interests that several States may
have in the institutional aspects of marriage [because] to do
so would impair "the proper functioning of our federal sys-
tem." The necessary accommodation between the right of one
State to safeguard its interest in the family relation of its own
people and the power of another State to [do the same - e.g.,
in Williams II to "grant divorces"] can be left to neither
State. 43
Public policy is so integral a part of the decision of a state as to who
can be married, to whom and under what circumstances, that no state
can dictate the terms of that relationship for another. Only overarch-
ing national goals, such as constitutionally compelled color-blindness
in the treatment of individuals by the government, 44 can override a
state's ordering of these relationships.
45
40. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Niagara of Wis. Paper Corp., 965 F.2d 355, 365 (7th Cir.
1992) ("Under the principles of federalism dictated by Erie v. Tompkins, our job is at an
end when we conclude (as we have) that the plain teaching of Wisconsin law commands
recognition of the public policy exception .... ).
41. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution provides: "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved
to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
42. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945) (Williams II).
43. Williams 11, 325 U.S. at 232.
44. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that marriage restrictions based
solely on race violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution).
45. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (holding a one-year durational residence
requirement for divorce constitutional). In Sosna, the Court concluded that the:
requirement... furthers the State's parallel interests in both avoiding officious
intermeddling in matters in which another State has a paramount interest,
and in minimizing the susceptibility of its own divorce decrees to collateral at-
tack. A State such as Iowa may quite reasonably decide that it does not wish to
become a divorce mill ....
Sosna, 419 U.S. at 407.
1998]
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States are free to apply their own law (in cases over which they
have jurisdiction) and, thus, are free to disregard the laws of sister
states which compete for application. 4 6 This rule may be overcome
when Congress sets a different norm by requiring full faith and credit
to a sister state's law. 47 When Congress has not acted, however, the
authority of states to apply their own law according to their own
choice-of-law rules remains robust. 48
Judges and commentators have suggested a variety of constitu-
tional limitations on a state's freedom to apply its own law to a case
properly before it (or, if you will, to disregard foreign law because it
violates the public policy of the forum). Most important among these
is the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirement that the fo-
rum bear a constitutionally sufficient nexus with the subject matter of
the litigation.49 Once this hurdle is cleared, states remain free to
choose law.
46. Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 664 ("A court may be guided by the forum State's 'public
policy' in determining the law applicable to a controversy.").
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(a) (Supp. 1998) (The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act).
According to the Supreme Court:
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA or Act) imposes a duty on the
States to enforce a child custody determination entered by a court of a sister
State if the determination is consistent with the provisions of the Act. In order
for a state court's custody decree to be consistent with the provisions of the Act,
the State must have jurisdiction under its own local law and one of five condi-
tions set out in § 1738A(c)(2) must be met. Briefly put, these conditions author-
ize the state court to enter a custody decree if the child's home is or recently
has been in the State, if the child has no home State and it would be in the
child's best interest for the State to assume jurisdiction, or if the child is pres-
ent in the State and has been abandoned or abused. Once a State exercises
jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of the Act, no other State may ex-
ercise concurrent jurisdiction over the custody dispute, § 1738A(g), even if it
would have been empowered to take jurisdiction in the first instance, and all
States must accord full faith and credit to the first State's ensuing custody
decree.
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1988). For an analysis of the road not
taken by the Supreme Court in Thompson with respect to whether the PKPA should
furnish an implied cause of action in federal court to determine which of two conflicting
state custody decisions is valid, see L. Lynn Hogue, Enforcing the Full Faith and Credit
Clause: Congress Legislates Finality for Child Custody Decrees, 1 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 157
(1985).
48. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (declaring that neither national
unity nor foreign state sovereignty - interests represented by the Full Faith and Credit
and Due Process Clauses - are threatened by the forum state's application of the "bet-
ter rule" conflicts principle).
49. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (holding that the application of
forum law to a case with no forum contacts violated due process); Baker, 118 S. Ct. at
663-64 ("A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory author-
ity over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recogni-
tion throughout the land."). See also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988)
(holding that due process does not bar the former state from applying its statute of
limitations to substantive claims governed by the law of the different state). The opin-
ion in the Dick case has received significant revisionist attention. See Jeffrey L. Ren-
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Other barriers have been posited, but these prove less formidable.
Justice Brandeis, for example, objected to a forum's rejection of a for-
eign defense based on public policy grounds:
A State may, on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause of
action. In so doing, it merely denies a remedy, leaving
unimpaired the plaintiffs substantive right, so that he is free
to enforce it elsewhere. But to refuse to give effect to a sub-
stantive defense under the applicable law of another State...
subjects the defendant to irremediable liability. This may not
be done. 50
This public policy concern has attracted the attention of other com-
mentators as well.5 1
Professor Douglas Laycock has argued that any choice-of-law rule
that allows the forum to prefer its own law merely because it is its own
is incompatible with fundamental principles of federalism. 52 Such a
preference for forum law frustrates the orderly "rule of law" since "no
person can know [prospectively] the law that governs his con-
duct .... ,,53 Such objections, insofar as they do not rise to the thresh-
old of the due process clause discussed above, should be: (1) trumped
by the more robust principle of federalism; (2) embraced by the Tenth
Amendment; and (3) bolstered by the domestic relations exception
(discussed elsewhere) 54 that preserves important matters of family
definition to the states.
5 5
Similarly, Professor John Hart Ely has questioned the constitu-
tionality of interest analysis, a choice-of-law technique that allows fo-
sberger, Who Was Dick? Constitutional Limitation on State Choice of Law, 1998 UTAH
L. REV. 37 (1998); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (holding that
the application of the forum law to all members of a class was "sufficiently arbitrary and
unfair" so as to violate due process).
50. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932).
51. See Brainard Currie & Herma Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the
Conflict of Laws; Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960), reprinted in
BRAINARD CURRIE SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 445 (1963). The United
States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that slight variations in the rights ac-
corded residents and non-residents in state courts violates the privileges and immuni-
ties clause. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; Canadian N. Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553,
562 (1920) ("[T]he constitutional requirement is satisfied if the nonresident is given ac-
cess to the courts of the state upon terms which in themselves are reasonable and ade-
quate for the enforcing of any rights he may have, even though they may not be
technically and precisely the same in extent as those accorded to resident citizens.").
52. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitu-
tional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 310-11 (1992).
53. Laycock, 92 COLUM. L. REV. at 337.
54. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
55. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (holding that the state's interest in mar-
riage dissolution trumps an individual's interest in a more expeditious divorce).
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rum policy preferences to displace foreign law.5 6 This barrier has
proven no more formidable than the others. States remain free to in-
voke the public policy exception as the United States Supreme Court
has recently affirmed. 57 Thus, the subject is properly the province of
state law.
THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION AND THE COMMON-LAW
In the context of marriage recognition, common-law applications
of the public policy exception depend on the particular issue before the
court. Consider, for example, two conflicts casebook chestnuts: In re
May's Estate5 s and In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate.59 Brief attention to
these two cases clarifies the issue.
In May's Estate, two New Yorkers, Sam and Fannie May, uncle
and niece, were married in Rhode Island because, under the law of
New York, their marriage would have been incestuous and void and
would have exposed them to criminal liability. They presumably
chose Rhode Island because it had a statutory exception for "any mar-
riage which shall be solemnized among the Jews, within the degrees of
affinity or consanguinity allowed by their religion."60 The May's were
married in 1913 at the home of a Jewish rabbi and two weeks later
returned to New York where they lived together as husband and wife
until Fannie's death in 1945. After Fannie's death, a daughter of the
May's - a wannabe bastard of sorts - brought an action alleging that
her parents' Rhode Island marriage was invalid because of the impedi-
ment of consanguinity. The issue of the marriage's validity arose in
the context of a challenge to Sam May's right to letters of administra-
tion. The Surrogate ruled against Sam May, but that ruling was re-
versed by the appellate division and affirmed by the New York Court
of Appeals. The court of appeals' approach to the application of the
public policy exception is typical:
[M]arriage... between persons of the Jewish faith whose kin-
ship was not in the direct ascending or descending line of con-
sanguinity and who were not brother and sister-we
conclude ... was not offensive to the public sense of morality
to a degree regarded generally with abhorrence and thus was
not within the inhibitions of natural law .... 61
56. See John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own,
23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981).
57. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 657.
58. 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).
59. 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
60. In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1953).
61. May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d at 14-15.
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The court attached significance to the conformity of the marriage with
Jewish religious law and to the fact that the marriage was expressly
lawful in Rhode Island.
The second case, Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, presented the problem
of how to address the inheritance rights of two putative, surviving
spouses of a polygamous marriage contracted in India where such
marriages were allowed. The California Court of Appeals concluded
that California public policy did not preclude recognition of the mar-
riage for inheritance purposes and allowed the two wives to share
equally in the proceeds of the estate.
Proponents of same-sex marraige will cite May's Estate and Dalip
Singh Bir's Estate as indicative of how states should recognize mar-
riages performed elsewhere that would violate state law (if originally
performed within the forum state). However, both cases fail with
their treatment of the apparent issue of recognizing what would other-
wise be a marital union against public policy - incestuous in the first
case, polygamous in the second. In fact, the issue of the validity of the
marriage is in reality collateral to the issues of administration of the
decedent's estate or the disposition of property after the death of one
of the married parties. Service as an administrator and inheritance
are both incidents of marriage which are tendered for resolution as
choices of law. But in both cases, the fact of spousal death no doubt
blunts any moral concern by society and by the court about the under-
lying immoral conduct. This is so because the cause for offense, the
repugnant conduct - the incest and the polygamy - has disappeared
with the death of a spouse and the end of the marriage. The morally
opprobrious conduct is all in the past; the cause for societal outrage is
merely tangential to the resolution of a more mundane legal problem.
Moreover, because some of the principals are now deceased, there is
less (arguably nothing) to be gained by a punitive vindication of the
public policy. Enforcement would not have a deterrent effect on the
conduct of others.
These two cases are typical of the problem. Marriage has many
incidents beyond licit sexual congress - a spousal share of the mari-
tal estate upon the death of a spouse, pension rights, health and insur-
ance benefits, to mention a few. Adjudication of these incidents may
raise the necessity of resolving the validity of the marriage and, in
turn, triggers the application vel non of the public policy exception. So
long as the adjudication of the incident does not compel the court to
bless an odious union, public policy will not be a bar.
Two proponents of the recognition of same-sex unions as mar-
riages have published extensive canvasses of the common-law prac-
tices of courts in applying the public policy exception. Barbara Cox in
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her 1996 study,6 2 and more recently Andrew Koppelman, 63 analyze
May's Estate, and Dalip Singh Bir, and numerous other cases. What
Cox and Koppelman find is a pattern that simply mirrors our para-
digm cases. Beyond that, Cox concluded:
[Courts] clearly believe that they are justified in rejecting
their own choice-of-law rules in order to refuse recognition to
a validly contracted marriage [i.e., one valid at the place of
marriage]. But they have been quite reluctant to use the excep-
tion and quite liberal in recognizing marriages celebrated in
other states.64
In other words, the public policy exception is available as a device
to invalidate foreign marriages, but it is not invariably used. What
follows in both articles is a supposed parade of horribles - a refusal to
apply the public policy exception to the following cases which results
in a validation for some purposes of the marriage. Cox concluded that
courts failed to invoke the public policy exception to invalidate under-
age marriages, miscegenous marriages, polygamous marriages, biga-
mous marriages, common law marriages, and incestuous marriages
all violative of the law of the forum adjudicating the case. Koppel-
man's list, even though more extensive, is similar. He, too, concludes
that a "blanket rule of nonrecognition ... is very nearly unheard of in
the United States."65 And the conclusion urged upon the reader is
that, because exceptions are made in all of these instances, many of
them stark affronts to forum law and policy, the sting of the law's re-
buke expressed in the public policy exception which stands ready to
invalidate same-sex unions will (or should) similarly be stayed. Such
is unlikely to be the case, however, if the incident of the same-sex pu-
tative marriage sought to be vindicated is licit venereal acts. This is
particularly true in states, such as Georgia, which prohibit even con-
sensual homosexual conduct 66 and is likely to be so even in states
which tolerate it by decriminalizing homosexual conduct.
In states which have adopted anti-recognition statutes such as
Georgia's,6 7 which is typical, other incidents as well will be disposed of
62. See Barbara Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception in
Choice-of-Law: Does It Really Exist?, 16 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 61 (1996).
63. See Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy,
76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998).
64. Cox, 16 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. at 61 (emphasis added).
65. Koppelman, 76 TEX. L. REV. at 962.
66. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1998) ("A person commits the offense of sodomy
when he or she performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another."). The Supreme Court upheld section 16-6-2
in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
67. Georgia's anti-recognition statute provides:
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because the state courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate rights "arising
as a result of or in connection with [same-sex unions]."68
Therefore, the opinions in May's Estate and Dalip Singh Bir's Es-
tate hold the key. A distinction can be made where the resolution of
an issue about the validity of a marriage concerns only an incident of
marriage, for example, regarding a widow or widower, and the matter
is not one "regarded generally with abhorrence and thus... not within
the inhibitions of natural law .... "69 What about cases in which the
degree of moral opprobrium is strong because of the presence of abhor-
rent conduct? In those cases, the public policy exception is likely to
assure short shrift to supplicants for same-sex unions.
CONCLUSION
The future of homosexual unions will be determined, in the end,
by state legislatures and courts. State courts will rely principally on
the public policy exception to avoid enforcement of foreign "same-sex
unions." The Full Faith and Credit Clause and one of its implement-
ing provisions, the Defense of Marriage Act, will also play roles;
although because neither is the subject of this essay, I leave them for
others in this Symposium to address. I remain unpersuaded by argu-
ments that DOMA is unconstitutional.70 Baker, of course, will play no
role, as Dean Patrick Borchers demonstrates in his Symposium arti-
cle,71 other than to allow use of the public policy exception.
Reflective analysis reveals that state common-law doctrine will be
no more helpful to proponents of recognizing same-sex unions than
are the anti-recognition statutes adopted in a number of states. The
exception persists as a basis for rejecting foreign marriages which in-
(a) It is declared to be the policy of this state to recognize the union only of man
and woman. Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited in this
state.
(b) No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recognized as entitled
to the benefits of marriage. Any marriage entered into by persons of the same
sex pursuant to a marriage license issued by another state or foreign jurisdic-
tion or otherwise shall be void in this state. Any contractual rights granted by
virtue of such license shall be unenforceable in the courts of this state and the
courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction whatsoever under any circum-
stances to grant a divorce or separate maintenance with respect to such mar-
riage or otherwise to consider or rule on any of the parties' respective rights
arising as a result or in connection with such marriage.
GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1998). Furthermore, Georgia law provides: "No marriage
license shall be issued to persons of the same sex." GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-3-30 (1998).
68. GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-3-3.1(b) (1998).
69. May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d at 4.
70. E.g., Paige E. Chabora, Congress' Power Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 604 (1997) (declaring
that DOMA is unconstitutional).
71. Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdic-
tional Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147 (1998).
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volve present conduct as an incident that the forum finds objectiona-
ble. In sum, states will enforce the public policy exception to same-sex
"marriages" contracted out of state in the same way that they have
treated other odious foreign marriages involving abhorrent conduct.
